The Second Battle of Sirte (on 22 March 1942) was a naval engagement in the Mediterranean Sea, north of the Gulf of Sidra and south-east of Malta, during the Second World War. The escorting warships of a British convoy to Malta held off a much more powerful squadron of the Regia Marina (Italian Navy). The British convoy was composed of four merchant ships, escorted by four light cruisers, one anti-aircraft cruiser and 17 destroyers. The Italian force comprised a battleship, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser and ten destroyers. Despite the British success at warding off the Italian squadron, the Italian fleet attack delayed the convoy's planned arrival before dawn, which exposed it to intense air attacks that sank all four merchant ships and one of the escorting destroyers in the following days.

Background

Malta

Up to the end of 1941, 21 ships with 160000 LT of cargo had reached Malta without loss and a reserve of seven months' supplies had been accumulated. Three convoys to Malta in 1941 suffered the loss of only one merchant ship. From January 1941 to August 1942, 46 ships had delivered 320000 LT but 25 ships had been sunk and modern, efficient merchant ships, naval and air forces had been diverted from other routes for long periods; 31 supply runs by submarines had been conducted. Reinforcements for Malta included 19 costly and dangerous aircraft carrier ferry operations to deliver fighters. Malta was also a base for air, sea and submarine operations against Axis supply convoys and from 1 June to 31 October 1941, British forces sank about 220000 LT of Axis shipping on the African convoy routes, 94000 LT by the navy and 115000 LT by the Royal Air Force (RAF) and Fleet Air Arm (FAA). Loaded ships sailing to Africa accounted for 90 per cent of the ships sunk and Malta-based squadrons were responsible for about 75 per cent of the ships sunk by aircraft. Military operations from Malta and using the island as a staging post, led to Axis air campaigns against the island in 1941 and 1942.. By early 1942 the Allies had lost the initiative in the central Mediterranean as Italian and German forces isolated Malta and made plans to remove it as a threat. After a series of Allied defeats, the Italian Navy achieved naval superiority in the central Mediterranean by spring 1942. As Malta was running short of aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, fuel, food and ammunition, convoy MW10 sailed from Alexandria on 21 March. The British expected opposition from German and Italian aircraft as well as Italian surface units. In December 1941, the two battleships (HMS Queen Elizabeth (1913) and HMS Valiant (1914)) stationed in the eastern Mediterranean had been disabled by an attack by Italian frogmen, leaving the fleet with only cruisers and destroyers. A diversion was organised from Gibraltar, on the morning of 20 March, the battleship HMS Malaya—with the aircraft carriers HMS Eagle (1918) and HMS Argus (I49), supported by the cruiser HMS Hermione (74) and eight destroyers—sailed. The next day, the squadron aborted the operation and returned to port—the carriers were unable to launch aircraft reinforcements to Malta due to defective long-range fuel tanks. The escort of convoy MW10 relied on destroyers—including lighter-built destroyer escorts—to provide anti-submarine protection and included the anti-aircraft cruiser HMS Carlisle (D67). More destroyers and another light cruiser were sent from Malta.

British plan

Admiral Sir Philip Vian, commanding the convoy, organised his ships into six divisions plus a close escort of five Hunt-class destroyers for the convoy In case of an Italian surface attack, the first five divisions were to stand off from the convoy to face the enemy while the sixth division laid smoke across the wake of the convoy to obscure it. The first five divisions would act as a rearguard to lay smoke and delay the Regia Marina while Carlisle and the Hunt-class destroyers proceeded with the cargo ships to Malta.

Battle

At 14:30 the next day, the British were faced by a pair of heavy cruisers and escorting destroyers. Admiral Vian immediately implemented his plan; the cargo ships and escorts turned away to the south while the light cruisers and remaining destroyers laid smoke and charged the Italians. After an exchange of fire, the two Italian heavy cruisers backed off in an attempt to lure the British toward the incoming main Italian squadron, and at 16:37 they returned to attack with the battleship ITALIAN BATTLESHIP Littorio, a light cruiser and their screening destroyers. The battle raged for two and a half hours, with the British ships leaving the safety of their huge smoke screen to fire a few volleys and then returning to it when the Italian salvos got too close. During one of these exchanges, HMS Havock (H43) suffered severre damage from a near-miss when fired at by the Italian battleship Littorio, and was ordered to withdraw from the battle line and join the convoy. At 18:34, Vian decided to send his destroyers in to launch torpedo attacks from about 5000 yd, the closest the Italians would allow the British to approach. None of the torpedoes found their targets but as HMS Kingston (F64) turned she was hit by a round that penetrated her boiler room and ignited a fire, temporarily bringing her to a halt. The battle began with a 25 kn wind blowing to the north-west, with the wind continuing to increase during the day, which favoured the gunnery of the larger Italian ships throughout the battle but aided the laying of smokescreens by Vian's ships. HMS Lively (G40) was struck by shell splinters from the battleship's main guns that pierced a bulkhead, causing some flooding but no casualties. At 18:55, Littorio had been hit by a 4.7 in (120 mm) shell, with negligible damage. Her floatplane caught fire from the blast from a salvo of her after turret at the same time; this led to the claim by the British that one of the torpedoes had struck. At dusk, before 19:00, the Italians gave up and turned for home; without radar they would have been at a significant disadvantage in a night action, as in the Battle of Cape Matapan. The Italians outgunned their British counterparts but appeared unwilling to close for a decisive blow, perhaps wary of the torpedo threat from the many British destroyers.

Aftermath

Analysis

Almost all authors have called the battle as a British victory, credited to the escort of light cruisers and destroyers which prevented the Italians from damaging the convoy, by repulsing an Italian squadron composed of a battleship and two heavy cruisers during massed Axis air attacks. Some authors, while generally acknowledging the British success, write of the battle as a partial Italian achievement in delaying and turning the convoy aside. Nearly all sources agree that the Italian fleet inflicted significant damage and several casualties on the British squadron while suffering minimal damage and no casualties in return. Axis aircraft caught the British convoy at sea and chased the surviving steamers to the harbour; more than 80 per cent of the supplies were lost, making the British convoy operation a strategic failure.

Orders of battle

Regia Marina

Merchant Navy

Royal Navy

Battle damage

According to British reports, "HMS Cleopatra (33) was struck on the after part of the bridge at 16:44" by a 152 mm hit from the light cruiser ITALIAN CRUISER Giovanni delle Bande Nere; 16 seamen were killed. According to Admiral Iachino, the hit was instead achieved by Littorio 's secondary guns, based on the range between the opposite warships at the time. Cruisers HMS Euryalus (42) and HMS Penelope (97) were also damaged, with Euryalus straddled by Littorio at 16:43 and at 18:41. Kingston was hit amidships by a shell from Littorio that killed 15 men of her crew. and left the destroyer dead in the water, with her starboard whaleboat torn apart, her anti-aircraft guns, searchlight tower and torpedo launchers shattered by the explosion. Some sources claim that she was hit by the guns of the heavy cruiser ITALIAN CRUISER Gorizia. Although Kingston had an engine in flames and a flooded boiler, she managed to get back up to speed, reaching Malta the next day. Havock was also badly damaged in a boiler by a near miss from Littorio at 17:20; eight sailors died. Lively was forced to retreat to Tobruk for repairs at 18:55, after a near miss' splinter from Littorio's aft turret holed her hull, resulting in some flooding. Three more destroyers—HMS Sikh (F82), HMS Legion (G74) and HMS Lance (G87)—suffered lesser damage from 8 in cruiser fire. The Italian fleet expended 1,511 rounds of all calibres upon the British squadron; the only Italian destroyer to open fire was ITALIAN DESTROYER Aviere. The British cruisers had replied with 1,553 rounds and the destroyers with about 1,300 rounds as well as 38 torpedoes. Axis aircraft made continual attacks, mainly against the convoy, throughout the naval action and Royal Navy AA gunners claimed the destruction of seven Axis aircraft and damage to several more.

Subsequent operations

Most of the escort force, short of fuel and ammunition and unable to find the convoy, turned back for Alexandria. The damaged destroyers and the cargo ships were sent on to Malta, with Carlisle, Penelope and Legion. The next day, they were subjected to continuous air attacks. The cargo ship SS Clan Campbell (1937) was sunk 20 nmi from harbour and the oil tanker MV Breconshire (1939) was too damaged to reach Valletta. The merchantmen, Talabot and steamer Pampas, reached Grand Harbour virtually unharmed. Pampas had been hit by two bombs but these failed to explode. Penelope attempted to tow Breconshire, but the tow parted in heavy seas. She anchored short of the protective minefields and the destroyer Southwold attempted to take her in tow, hitting a mine in the process. She was eventually towed into Marsaxlokk Bay by tugs. Axis air raids against Malta on 24 and 25 March failed to damage the three surviving convoy ships. On 26 March, German dive bombers hit all three ships, sinking Talabot and Pampas that day with Breconshire capsizing on 27 March. Much of Breconshire′s oil was salvaged through the hole in her hull. Only about 5000 ST of cargo had been unloaded, of the 26000 ST that had been loaded in Alexandria. The Italian fleet units were no luckier after the battle. After failing to destroy the convoy, they were caught en route to their bases by a severe storm that sank the destroyers ITALIAN DESTROYER Scirocco and ITALIAN DESTROYER Lanciere. While under repair in dry dock at Malta, Kingston was attacked a few days later by German aircraft and suffered further damage, this time beyond repair. She was scrapped in situ in the following months. Whilst docked at Malta, Havock, was a target for Axis aircraft and sustained further damage. On 3 April the ship was ordered to Gibraltar before her repairs were complete. Havock ran aground off Kelibia, Tunisia, in the Strait of Sicily on 6 April and was wrecked, with one crewman killed in the incident. Another one died from wounds in the following days. On 8 April an Italian boarding party from the tug Instancabile (former Royal Yugoslav Navy Spasilac) searched the wreck looking for secret information. Havock's crew and passengers were interned by the Vichy French at Laghouat in the Sahara but were released in November as a result of Operation Torch.

Footnotes

Sources