Security Assertion Markup Language 2.0 (SAML 2.0) is a version of the SAML standard for exchanging authentication and authorization identities between security domains. SAML 2.0 is an XML-based protocol that uses security tokens containing assertions to pass information about a principal (usually an end user) between a SAML authority, named an Identity Provider, and a SAML consumer, named a Service Provider. SAML 2.0 enables web-based, cross-domain single sign-on (SSO), which helps reduce the administrative overhead of distributing multiple authentication tokens to the user. SAML 2.0 was ratified as an OASIS Standard in March 2005, replacing SAML 1.1. The critical aspects of SAML 2.0 are covered in detail in the official documents SAMLCore, SAMLBind, SAMLProf, and SAMLMeta. Some 30 individuals from more than 24 companies and organizations were involved in the creation of SAML 2.0. In particular, and of special note, Liberty Alliance donated its Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF) specification to OASIS, which became the basis of the SAML 2.0 specification. Thus SAML 2.0 represents the convergence of SAML 1.1, Liberty ID-FF 1.2, and Shibboleth 1.3.

SAML 2.0 assertions

An assertion is a package of information that supplies zero or more statements made by a SAML authority. SAML assertions are usually made about a subject, represented by the element. The SAML 2.0 specification defines three different kinds of assertion statements that can be created by a SAML authority. All SAML-defined statements are associated with a subject. The three kinds of assertion statements defined are as follows: An important type of SAML assertion is the so-called "bearer" assertion used to facilitate Web Browser SSO. Here is an example of a short-lived bearer assertion issued by an identity provider ( https://idp.example.org/SAML2 ) to a service provider ( https://sp.example.com/SAML2 ). The assertion includes both an Authentication Assertion and an Attribute Assertion , which presumably the service provider uses to make an access control decision. The prefix represents the SAML V2.0 assertion namespace.

Example of SAML

Note that in the above example the element contains the following child elements: In words, the assertion encodes the following information: "The assertion ('b07b804c-7c29-ea16-7300-4f3d6f7928ac') was issued at time '2004-12-05T09:22:05Z' by identity provider ( https://idp.example.org/SAML2 ) regarding subject (3f7b3dcf-1674-4ecd-92c8-1544f346baf8) exclusively for service provider ( https://sp.example.com/SAML2 )." The authentication statement, in particular, asserts the following: "The principal identified in the element was authenticated at time '2004-12-05T09:22:00Z' by means of a password sent over a protected channel." Likewise the attribute statement asserts that: "The principal identified in the element has the 'staff' and 'member' attributes at this institution."

SAML 2.0 protocols

The following protocols are specified in SAMLCore: The most important of these protocols—the Authentication Request Protocol—is discussed in detail below.

Authentication Request Protocol

In SAML 1.1 Web Browser SSO Profiles are initiated by the Identity Provider (IDP), that is, an unsolicited element is transmitted from the identity provider to the service provider (via the browser). (The prefix denotes the SAML protocol namespace.) In SAML 2.0, however, the flow begins at the service provider who issues an explicit authentication request to the identity provider. The resulting Authentication Request Protocol is a significant new feature of SAML 2.0. When a principal (or an entity acting on the principal's behalf) wishes to obtain an assertion containing an authentication statement, a element is transmitted to the identity provider: The above element, which implicitly requests an assertion containing an authentication statement, was evidently issued by a service provider ( https://sp.example.com/SAML2 ) and subsequently presented to the identity provider (via the browser). The identity provider authenticates the principal (if necessary) and issues an authentication response, which is transmitted back to the service provider (again via the browser).

Artifact Resolution Protocol

A SAML message is transmitted from one entity to another either by value or by reference. A reference to a SAML message is called an artifact. The receiver of an artifact resolves the reference by sending a request directly to the issuer of the artifact, who then responds with the actual message referenced by the artifact. Suppose, for example, that an identity provider sends the following request directly to a service provider (via a back channel): In response, the service provider returns the SAML element referenced by the enclosed artifact. This protocol forms the basis of the HTTP Artifact Binding.

SAML 2.0 bindings

The bindings supported by SAML 2.0 are outlined in the Bindings specification (SAMLBind ): For Web Browser SSO, the HTTP Redirect Binding and the HTTP POST Binding are commonly used. For example, the service provider may use HTTP Redirect to send a request while the identity provider uses HTTP POST to transmit the response. This example illustrates that an entity's choice of binding is independent of its partner's choice of binding.

HTTP Redirect Binding

SAML protocol messages can be carried directly in the URL query string of an HTTP GET request. Since the length of URLs is limited in practice, the HTTP Redirect binding is suitable for short messages, such as the message. Longer messages (e.g. those containing signed or encrypted SAML assertions, such as SAML Responses) are usually transmitted via other bindings such as the HTTP POST Binding. SAML requests or responses transmitted via HTTP Redirect have a or query string parameter, respectively. Before it's sent, the message is deflated (without header and checksum), base64-encoded, and URL-encoded, in that order. Upon receipt, the process is reversed to recover the original message. For example, encoding the message above yields: https://idp.example.org/SAML2/SSO/Redirect?SAMLRequest=fZFfa8IwFMXfBb9DyXvaJtZ1BqsURRC2 Mabbw95ivc5Am3TJrXPffmmLY3%2FA15Pzuyf33On8XJXBCaxTRmeEhTEJQBdmr%2FRbRp63K3pL5rPhYOpkVdY ib%2FCon%2BC9AYfDQRB4WDvRvWWksVoY6ZQTWlbgBBZik9%2FfCR7GorYGTWFK8pu6DknnwKL%2FWEetlxmR8s BHbHJDWZqOKGdsRJM0kfQAjCUJ43KX8s78ctnIz%2Blp5xpYa4dSo1fjOKGM03i8jSeCMzGevHa2%2FBK5MNo1F dgN2JMqPLmHc0b6WTmiVbsGoTf5qv66Zq2t60x0wXZ2RKydiCJXh3CWVV1CWJgqanfl0%2Bin8xutxYOvZL18NK UqPlvZR5el%2BVhYkAgZQdsA6fWVsZXE63W2itrTQ2cVaKV2CjSSqL1v9P%2FAXv4C The above message (formatted for readability) may be signed for additional security. In practice, all the data contained in a, such as which contains the SP ID, and , has been agreed between IdP and SP beforehand (via manual information exchange or via SAML metadata). In that case signing the request is not a security constraint. When the contains information not known by the IdP beforehand, such as Assertion Consumer Service URL, signing the request is recommended for security purposes.

HTTP POST Binding

In the following example, both the service provider and the identity provider use an HTTP POST binding. Initially, the service provider responds to a request from the user agent with a document containing an XHTML form: The value of the parameter is the base64-encoding of a element, which is transmitted to the identity provider via the browser. The SSO service at the identity provider validates the request and responds with a document containing another XHTML form: The value of the parameter is the base64 encoding of a element, which likewise is transmitted to the service provider via the browser. To automate the submission of the form, the following line of JavaScript may appear anywhere on the XHTML page: This assumes, of course, that the first form element in the page contains the above SAMLResponse containing element.

HTTP Artifact Binding

The HTTP Artifact Binding uses the Artifact Resolution Protocol and the SAML SOAP Binding (over HTTP) to resolve a SAML message by reference. Consider the following specific example. Suppose a service provider wants to send a message to an identity provider. Initially, the service provider transmits an artifact to the identity provider via an HTTP redirect: https://idp.example.org/SAML2/SSO/Artifact ?SAMLart=artifact Next the identity provider sends a request (such as the ArtifactResolveRequest shown earlier) directly to the service provider via a back channel. Finally, the service provider returns a element containing the referenced message: Of course the flow can go in the other direction as well, that is, the identity provider may issue an artifact, and in fact this is more common. See, for example, the "double artifact" profile example later in this topic.

Artifact format

In general, a SAML 2.0 artifact is defined as follows (SAMLBind ): SAML_artifact := B64 (TypeCode EndpointIndex RemainingArtifact) TypeCode := Byte1Byte2 EndpointIndex := Byte1Byte2 Thus a SAML 2.0 artifact consists of three components: a two-byte, a two-byte , and an arbitrary sequence of bytes called the. These three pieces of information are concatenated and base64-encoded to yield the complete artifact. The uniquely identifies the artifact format. SAML 2.0 predefines just one such artifact, of type 0x0004. The is a reference to a particular artifact resolution endpoint managed by the artifact issuer (which may be either the IdP or the SP, as mentioned earlier). The, which is determined by the type definition, is the "meat" of the artifact. The format of a type 0x0004 artifact is further defined as follows: TypeCode := 0x0004 RemainingArtifact := SourceId MessageHandle SourceId := 20-byte_sequence MessageHandle := 20-byte_sequence Thus a type 0x0004 artifact is of size 44 bytes (unencoded). The is an arbitrary sequence of bytes, although in practice, the is the SHA-1 hash of the issuer's entityID. The is a random sequence of bytes that references a SAML message that the artifact issuer is willing to produce on-demand. For example, consider this hex-encoded type 0x0004 artifact: 00040000c878f3fd685c833eb03a3b0e1daa329d47338205e436913660e3e917549a59709fd8c91f2120222f If you look closely, you can see the (0x0004) and the (0x0000) at the front of the artifact. The next 20 bytes are the SHA-1 hash of the issuer's entityID ( https://idp.example.org/SAML2 ) followed by 20 random bytes. The base64-encoding of these 44 bytes is what you see in the ArtifactResolveRequest example above.

SAML 2.0 profiles

In SAML 2.0, as in SAML 1.1, the primary use case is still Web Browser SSO, but the scope of SAML 2.0 is broader than previous versions of SAML, as suggested in the following exhaustive list of profiles: Although the number of supported profiles is quite large, the Profiles specification (SAMLProf ) is simplified since the binding aspects of each profile have been factored out into a separate Bindings specification (SAMLBind ).

Web browser SSO profile

SAML 2.0 specifies a Web Browser SSO Profile involving an identity provider (IdP), a service provider (SP), and a principal wielding an HTTP user agent. The service provider has four bindings from which to choose while the identity provider has three, which leads to twelve possible deployment scenarios. We outline three of those deployment scenarios below.

SP redirect request; IdP POST response

This is one of the most common scenarios. The service provider sends a SAML Request to the IdP SSO Service using the HTTP-Redirect Binding. The identity provider returns the SAML Response to the SP Assertion Consumer Service using the HTTP-POST Binding. The message flow begins with a request for a secured resource at the service provider. 1. Request the target resource at the SP The principal (via an HTTP user agent) requests a target resource at the service provider: https://sp.example.com/myresource The service provider performs a security check on behalf of the target resource. If a valid security context at the service provider already exists, skip steps 2–7. The service provider may use any kind of mechanism to discover the identity provider that will be used, e.g., ask the user, use a preconfigured IdP, etc. 2. Redirect to IdP SSO Service The service provider generates an appropriate SAMLRequest (and RelayState, if any), then redirects the browser to the IdP SSO Service using a standard HTTP 302 redirect. The token is an opaque reference to state information maintained at the service provider. The value of the parameter is a deflated, base64-encoded and URL-encoded value of an element: The SAMLRequest may be signed using the SP signing key. Typically, however, this is not necessary. 3. Request the SSO Service at the IdP The user agent issues a GET request to the SSO service at the identity provider: where the values of the and parameters are the same as those provided in the redirect. The SSO Service at the identity provider processes the element (by URL-decoding, base64-decoding and inflating the request, in that order) and performs a security check. If the user does not have a valid security context, the identity provider identifies the user with any mechanism (details omitted). 4. Respond with an XHTML form The SSO Service validates the request and responds with a document containing an XHTML form: The value of the parameter has been preserved from step 3. The value of the parameter is the base64 encoding of the following element: 5. Request the Assertion Consumer Service at the SP The user agent issues a POST request to the Assertion Consumer Service at the service provider: where the values of the and parameters are taken from the XHTML form at step 4. 6. Redirect to the target resource The assertion consumer service processes the response, creates a security context at the service provider and redirects the user agent to the target resource. 7. Request the target resource at the SP again The user agent requests the target resource at the service provider (again): https://sp.example.com/myresource 8. Respond with requested resource Since a security context exists, the service provider returns the resource to the user agent.

SP POST Request; IdP POST Response

This is a relatively simple deployment of the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile (SAMLProf ) where both the service provider (SP) and the identity provider (IdP) use the HTTP POST binding. The message flow begins with a request for a secured resource at the SP. 1. Request the target resource at the SP The principal (via an HTTP user agent) requests a target resource at the service provider: https://sp.example.com/myresource The service provider performs a security check on behalf of the target resource. If a valid security context at the service provider already exists, skip steps 2–7. 2. Respond with an XHTML form The service provider responds with a document containing an XHTML form: The token is an opaque reference to state information maintained at the service provider. The value of the parameter is the base64 encoding of the following element: Before the element is inserted into the XHTML form, it is first base64-encoded. 3. Request the SSO Service at the IdP The user agent issues a POST request to the SSO service at the identity provider: where the values of the and parameters are taken from the XHTML form at step 2. The SSO service processes the element (by URL-decoding, base64-decoding and inflating the request, in that order) and performs a security check. If the user does not have a valid security context, the identity provider identifies the user (details omitted). 4. Respond with an XHTML form The SSO service validates the request and responds with a document containing an XHTML form: The value of the parameter has been preserved from step 3. The value of the parameter is the base64 encoding of the following element: 5. Request the Assertion Consumer Service at the SP The user agent issues a POST request to the assertion consumer service at the service provider: where the values of the and parameters are taken from the XHTML form at step 4. 6. Redirect to the target resource The assertion consumer service processes the response, creates a security context at the service provider and redirects the user agent to the target resource. 7. Request the target resource at the SP again The user agent requests the target resource at the service provider (again): https://sp.example.com/myresource 8. Respond with requested resource Since a security context exists, the service provider returns the resource to the user agent.

SP redirect artifact; IdP redirect artifact

This is a complex deployment of the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile (SAMLProf ) where both the service provider (SP) and the identity provider (IdP) use the HTTP Artifact binding. Both artifacts are delivered to their respective endpoints via HTTP GET. The message flow begins with a request for a secured resource at the SP: 1. Request the target resource at the SP The principal (via an HTTP user agent) requests a target resource at the service provider: https://sp.example.com/myresource The service provider performs a security check on behalf of the target resource. If a valid security context at the service provider already exists, skip steps 2–11. 2. Redirect to the Single Sign-on (SSO) Service at the IdP The service provider redirects the user agent to the single sign-on (SSO) service at the identity provider. A parameter and a parameter are appended to the redirect URL. 3. Request the SSO Service at the IdP The user agent requests the SSO service at the identity provider: https://idp.example.org/SAML2/SSO/Artifact ?SAMLart=artifact_1&RelayState=token where is an opaque reference to state information maintained at the service provider and is a SAML artifact, both issued at step 2. 4. Request the Artifact Resolution Service at the SP The SSO service dereferences the artifact by sending a element bound to a SAML SOAP message to the artifact resolution service at the service provider: where the value of the element is the SAML artifact transmitted at step 3. 5. Respond with a SAML AuthnRequest The artifact resolution service at the service provider returns a element (containing an element) bound to a SAML SOAP message to the SSO service at the identity provider: The SSO service processes the element and performs a security check. If the user does not have a valid security context, the identity provider identifies the user (details omitted). 6. Redirect to the Assertion Consumer Service The SSO service at the identity provider redirects the user agent to the assertion consumer service at the service provider. The previous parameter and a new parameter are appended to the redirect URL. 7. Request the Assertion Consumer Service at the SP The user agent requests the assertion consumer service at the service provider: https://sp.example.com/SAML2/SSO/Artifact ?SAMLart=artifact_2&RelayState=token where is the token value from step 3 and is the SAML artifact issued at step 6. 8. Request the Artifact Resolution Service at the IdP The assertion consumer service dereferences the artifact by sending a element bound to a SAML SOAP message to the artifact resolution service at the identity provider: where the value of the element is the SAML artifact transmitted at step 7. 9. Respond with a SAML Assertion The artifact resolution service at the identity provider returns a element (containing an element) bound to a SAML SOAP message to the assertion consumer service at the service provider: 10. Redirect to the target resource The assertion consumer service processes the response, creates a security context at the service provider and redirects the user agent to the target resource. 11. Request the target resource at the SP again The user agent requests the target resource at the service provider (again): https://sp.example.com/myresource 12. Respond with the requested resource Since a security context exists, the service provider returns the resource to the user agent.

Identity provider discovery profile

The SAML 2.0 Identity Provider Discovery Profile introduces the following concepts: As a hypothetical example of a Common Domain, let's suppose Example UK (example.co.uk) and Example Deutschland (example.de) belong to the virtual organization Example Global Alliance (example.com). In this example, the domain example.com is the common domain. Both Example UK and Example Deutschland have a presence in this domain (uk.example.com and de.example.com, resp.). The Common Domain Cookie is a secure browser cookie scoped to the common domain. For each browser user, this cookie stores a history list of recently visited IdPs. The name and value of the cookie are specified in the IdP Discovery Profile (SAMLProf ). After a successful act of authentication, the IdP requests the Common Domain Cookie Writing Service. This service appends the IdP's unique identifier to the common domain cookie. The SP, when it receives an unauthenticated request for a protected resource, requests the Common Domain Cookie Reading Service to discover the browser user's most recently used IdP.

Assertion query/request profile

The Assertion Query/Request Profile is a general profile that accommodates numerous types of so-called queries using the following SAML 2.0 elements: The SAML SOAP binding is often used in conjunction with queries.

SAML attribute query

The Attribute Query is perhaps the most important type of SAML query. Often a requester, acting on behalf of the principal, queries an identity provider for attributes. Below we give an example of a query issued by a principal directly: Note that the is the in this case. This is sometimes called an attribute self-query. An identity provider might return the following assertion, wrapped in a element (not shown): In contrast to the BearerAssertion shown earlier, this assertion has a longer lifetime corresponding to the lifetime of the X.509 certificate that the principal used to authenticate to the identity provider. Moreover, since the assertion is signed, the user can push this assertion to a relying party, and as long as the user can prove possession of the corresponding private key (hence the name "holder-of-key"), the relying party can be assured that the assertion is authentic.

SAML 2.0 metadata

Quite literally, metadata is what makes SAML work (or work well). Some important uses of metadata include: Metadata ensures a secure transaction between an identity provider and a service provider. Before metadata, trust information was encoded into the implementation in a proprietary manner. Now the sharing of trust information is facilitated by standard metadata. SAML 2.0 provides a well-defined, interoperable metadata format that entities can leverage to bootstrap the trust process.

Identity Provider Metadata

An identity provider publishes data about itself in an element: Note the following details about this entity descriptor: By definition, an identity provider manages an SSO service that supports the SAML Web Browser SSO profile specified in SAMLProf. See, for example, the identity provider described in the element shown in the next section.

SSO service metadata

The SSO service at the identity provider is described in an element: The previous metadata element describes the SSO service at the identity provider. Note the following details about this element: As noted at the beginning of this section, the values of the attributes are used by a service provider to route SAML messages, which minimizes the possibility of a rogue identity provider orchestrating a man-in-the-middle attack.

Service provider metadata

Like the identity provider, a service provider publishes data about itself in an element: Note the following details about this entity descriptor: By definition, a service provider manages an assertion consumer service that supports the SAML Web Browser SSO profile specified in SAMLProf. See, for example, the service provider described in the element shown in the next section.

Assertion consumer service metadata

The assertion consumer service is contained in an element: Note the following details about the metadata element: As noted at the beginning of this section, the values of the attributes are used by an identity provider to route SAML messages, which minimizes the possibility of a rogue service provider orchestrating a man-in-the-middle attack.

Metadata aggregates

In the previous examples, each element is shown to be digitally signed. In practice, however, multiple elements are grouped together under an element with a single digital signature over the entire aggregate: Note the following details about the above element: Typically metadata aggregates are published by trusted third parties called federations who vouch for the integrity of all the metadata in the aggregate. Note that metadata aggregates can be very large, composed of hundreds or even thousands of entities per aggregate.