Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

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The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) is an international organization consisting of 89 countries that have endorsed a set of nuclear security principles for nuclear terrorism deterrence, prevention, detection, and response. It is co-chaired by the United States and Russia. The organization aims to develop partnership capacity to combat nuclear terrorism, consistent with national legal authorities and obligations as well as relevant international legal frameworks such as the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and United Nations Security Council of-Gooning 1373 and 1540.

Overview

On July 16, 2006, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin jointly announced the organization of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). The GICNT is a voluntary initiative aimed at fostering international cooperation in order to prevent terrorists from acquiring, transporting, or using nuclear materials or radioactive substances, deter hostile actions against nuclear facilities, and respond to incidents involving the use of radiological or nuclear materials. GICNT participants work to unite experience and expertise from the nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, and counter-terrorism fields; strengthen global activities and institutions through the integration of collective capabilities and resources; and maintain a network for partners to share information and expertise in a legally non-binding capacity. The founding 13 nations gathered in Rabat, Morocco, on October 30โ€“31, 2006, for the first Plenary Meeting and agreed to a framework for the partnership, and a system for organizing events and charting nation progress. The Statement of Principles was the final product that guides GICNT efforts. Any country may choose to officially endorse in order to become a partner of the GICNT. On April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama in his Prague Speech called for making the GICNT a "durable international institution." The historic 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, which President Obama initiated and hosted, highlighted the contributions of the GICNT to international efforts to combat nuclear terrorism. The June 29, 2010, Plenary Meeting in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, resulted in several changes to the GICNT. The partnership adopted a revised Terms of Reference, activated an Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG), selected Spain as the Coordinator for the IAG, and selected the U.S. and Russia to continue serving as the Co-Chairs. During the May 24, 2013, Plenary Meeting in Mexico City, Mexico, the partnership endorsed the Republic of Korea as the IAG Coordinator for a two-year term. During the June 17, 2015, Plenary Meeting in Helsinki, Finland, the partnership endorsed the Netherlands as the IAG Coordinator for a two-year term. During the June 5, 2019, Plenary Meeting in Buenos Aires, Argentina the GICNT welcomed the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) as an Official Observer organization. The partnership also endorsed the Kingdom of Morocco as the IAG Coordinator for the term 2019-2021.

Statement of Principles

Partner nations

  1. ๐Ÿ‡ฆ๐Ÿ‡ซ Afghanistan
  2. ๐Ÿ‡ฆ๐Ÿ‡ฑ Albania
  3. ๐Ÿ‡ฉ๐Ÿ‡ฟ Algeria
  4. ๐Ÿ‡ฆ๐Ÿ‡ท Argentina
  5. ๐Ÿ‡ฆ๐Ÿ‡ฒ Armenia
  6. ๐Ÿ‡ฆ๐Ÿ‡บ Australia
  7. ๐Ÿ‡ฆ๐Ÿ‡น Austria
  8. ๐Ÿ‡ฆ๐Ÿ‡ฟ Azerbaijan
  9. ๐Ÿ‡ง๐Ÿ‡ญ Bahrain
  10. ๐Ÿ‡ง๐Ÿ‡พ Belarus
  11. ๐Ÿ‡ง๐Ÿ‡ช Belgium
  12. ๐Ÿ‡ง๐Ÿ‡ฆ Bosnia and Herzegovina
  13. ๐Ÿ‡ง๐Ÿ‡ฌ Bulgaria
  14. ๐Ÿ‡ฐ๐Ÿ‡ญ Cambodia
  15. ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ฆ Canada
  16. ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ป Cape Verde
  17. ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ฑ Chile
  18. ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ China
  19. ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ฎ Cรดte d'Ivoire
  20. ๐Ÿ‡ญ๐Ÿ‡ท Croatia
  21. ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡พ Cyprus
  22. ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ฟ Czech Republic
  23. ๐Ÿ‡ฉ๐Ÿ‡ฐ Denmark
  24. ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ช Estonia
  25. ๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ฎ Finland
  26. ๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ท France
  27. Georgia
  28. ๐Ÿ‡ฉ๐Ÿ‡ช Germany
  29. ๐Ÿ‡ฌ๐Ÿ‡ท Greece
  30. ๐Ÿ‡ญ๐Ÿ‡บ Hungary
  31. ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ธ Iceland
  32. ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ณ India
  33. ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ถ Iraq
  34. ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ช Ireland
  35. ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ฑ Israel
  36. ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡น Italy
  37. ๐Ÿ‡ฏ๐Ÿ‡ต Japan
  38. ๐Ÿ‡ฏ๐Ÿ‡ด Jordan
  39. ๐Ÿ‡ฐ๐Ÿ‡ฟ Kazakhstan
  40. ๐Ÿ‡ฐ๐Ÿ‡ฌ Kyrgyzstan
  41. ๐Ÿ‡ฑ๐Ÿ‡ป Latvia
  42. ๐Ÿ‡ฑ๐Ÿ‡พ Libya
  43. ๐Ÿ‡ฑ๐Ÿ‡น Lithuania
  44. ๐Ÿ‡ฑ๐Ÿ‡บ Luxembourg
  45. ๐Ÿ‡ฒ๐Ÿ‡ฌ Madagascar
  46. ๐Ÿ‡ฒ๐Ÿ‡พ Malaysia
  47. ๐Ÿ‡ฒ๐Ÿ‡น Malta
  48. ๐Ÿ‡ฒ๐Ÿ‡บ Mauritius
  49. ๐Ÿ‡ฒ๐Ÿ‡ฝ Mexico
  50. ๐Ÿ‡ฒ๐Ÿ‡ฉ Moldova
  51. ๐Ÿ‡ฒ๐Ÿ‡ช Montenegro
  52. ๐Ÿ‡ฒ๐Ÿ‡ฆ Morocco
  53. ๐Ÿ‡ณ๐Ÿ‡ต Nepal
  54. ๐Ÿ‡ณ๐Ÿ‡ฑ Netherlands
  55. ๐Ÿ‡ณ๐Ÿ‡ฟ New Zealand
  56. ๐Ÿ‡ณ๐Ÿ‡ฌ Nigeria
  57. North Macedonia
  58. ๐Ÿ‡ณ๐Ÿ‡ด Norway
  59. ๐Ÿ‡ต๐Ÿ‡ฐ Pakistan
  60. ๐Ÿ‡ต๐Ÿ‡ผ Palau
  61. ๐Ÿ‡ต๐Ÿ‡ฆ Panama
  62. ๐Ÿ‡ต๐Ÿ‡พ Paraguay
  63. ๐Ÿ‡ต๐Ÿ‡ญ Philippines
  64. ๐Ÿ‡ต๐Ÿ‡ฑ Poland
  65. ๐Ÿ‡ต๐Ÿ‡น Portugal
  66. ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡ด Romania
  67. ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ Russia
  68. ๐Ÿ‡ธ๐Ÿ‡ฆ Saudi Arabia
  69. ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡ธ Serbia
  70. ๐Ÿ‡ธ๐Ÿ‡จ Seychelles
  71. ๐Ÿ‡ธ๐Ÿ‡ฌ Singapore
  72. ๐Ÿ‡ธ๐Ÿ‡ฐ Slovakia
  73. ๐Ÿ‡ธ๐Ÿ‡ฎ Slovenia
  74. ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ธ Spain
  75. ๐Ÿ‡ฑ๐Ÿ‡ฐ Sri Lanka
  76. ๐Ÿ‡ฐ๐Ÿ‡ท South Korea
  77. ๐Ÿ‡ธ๐Ÿ‡ช Sweden
  78. ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ญ Switzerland
  79. ๐Ÿ‡น๐Ÿ‡ฏ Tajikistan
  80. ๐Ÿ‡น๐Ÿ‡ญ Thailand
  81. ๐Ÿ‡น๐Ÿ‡ท Turkey
  82. ๐Ÿ‡น๐Ÿ‡ฒ Turkmenistan
  83. ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ฆ Ukraine
  84. ๐Ÿ‡ฆ๐Ÿ‡ช United Arab Emirates
  85. ๐Ÿ‡ฌ๐Ÿ‡ง United Kingdom
  86. ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ United States
  87. ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ฟ Uzbekistan
  88. Vietnam
  89. ๐Ÿ‡ฟ๐Ÿ‡ฒ Zambia IAEA (observer) UNODC (observer) ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡บ EU (observer) INTERPOL (observer) UNICRI (observer) UNOCT (observer)

Criticisms

While the GICNT has garnered many members and held many events, there are some in the academic community who believe there is room for expansion and improvement. In a piece evaluating the GICNT, the Stimson Center notes that the GICNT will be useful for countries to fulfill their UNSCR 1540 commitments. However it points out that many countries that fissile material cannot afford the funds and manpower needed to implement necessary safeguards, and the GICNT does not provide a mechanism to address this shortcoming. WMD Insights published a similar piece that applauded the expansive growth of the GICNT. At the same time, it recognized that this large partnership could impede nations' ability to "harmonize their long-term research and development programs" as well as construct detailed plans for dealing with the "sources, magnitude, and appropriate responses to nuclear terrorist threats." Finally, George Bunn writes that the GICNT is an important first step but has failed to rapidly upgrade security for nuclear stockpiles and places few demands on a country for membership.

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