{"history":[],"article":{"id":"f304c395-9ae2-4332-9424-0ffe62eb96a2","title":"Cosmological argument","slug":"cosmological-argument","content":":::summary\n:::\n\n# \nIn the [philosophy of religion](https://bliptext.com/articles/philosophy-of-religion), a **cosmological argument** is an argument for the existence of [God](https://bliptext.com/articles/god) based upon [observational](https://bliptext.com/articles/observation) and [factual](https://bliptext.com/articles/fact) statements concerning the [universe](https://bliptext.com/articles/universe) (or some general category of its [natural](https://bliptext.com/articles/natural) contents) typically in the context of [causation](https://bliptext.com/articles/cause-and-effect), change, contingency or finitude.\nIn referring to [reason](https://bliptext.com/articles/reason) and observation alone for its [premises](https://bliptext.com/articles/premises), and precluding [revelation](https://bliptext.com/articles/revelation), this category of argument falls within the domain of [natural theology](https://bliptext.com/articles/natural-theology).\nA cosmological argument can also sometimes be referred to as an **argument from universal causation**, an **argument from first cause**, the **causal argument** or the **prime mover argument**.\nThe concept of causation is a principal underpinning idea in all cosmological arguments, particularly in affirming the necessity for a [First Cause](https://bliptext.com/articles/first-cause).\nThe latter is typically determined in [philosophical analysis](https://bliptext.com/articles/philosophical-analysis) to be [God](https://bliptext.com/articles/god), as identified within [classical conceptions of theism](https://bliptext.com/articles/classical-theism).\nThe origins of the argument date back to at least [Aristotle](https://bliptext.com/articles/aristotle), developed subsequently within the scholarly traditions of [Neoplatonism](https://bliptext.com/articles/neoplatonism) and [early Christianity](https://bliptext.com/articles/early-christianity), and later under medieval [Islamic](https://bliptext.com/articles/muslim) [scholasticism](https://bliptext.com/articles/scholasticism) through the 9th to 12th centuries.\nIt would eventually be re-introduced to Christian theology in the 13th century by [Thomas Aquinas](https://bliptext.com/articles/thomas-aquinas).\nIn the 18th century, it would become associated with the [principle of sufficient reason](https://bliptext.com/articles/principle-of-sufficient-reason) formulated by [Gottfried Leibniz](https://bliptext.com/articles/gottfried-leibniz) and [Samuel Clarke](https://bliptext.com/articles/samuel-clarke), itself an exposition of the [Parmenidean](https://bliptext.com/articles/parmenides) causal principle that \"[nothing comes from nothing](https://bliptext.com/articles/creatio-ex-materia)\".\n[Contemporary](https://bliptext.com/articles/contemporary-philosophy) defenders of cosmological arguments include [William Lane Craig](https://bliptext.com/articles/william-lane-craig), [Robert Koons](https://bliptext.com/articles/robert-koons), [John Lennox](https://bliptext.com/articles/john-lennox), [Stephen Meyer](https://bliptext.com/articles/stephen-meyer), and [Alexander Pruss](https://bliptext.com/articles/alexander-pruss).\n\n# History\n# [Plato and Aristotle, depicted here in Raphael's The School of Athens, both developed first cause arguments. | upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/98/Sanzio///01///Plato///Aristotle.jpg]\n\n## Classical philosophy\n[Plato](https://bliptext.com/articles/plato) (c. 427–347 BC) and [Aristotle](https://bliptext.com/articles/aristotle) (c. 384–322 BC) both posited first cause arguments, though each had certain notable caveats.\nIn [The Laws](https://bliptext.com/articles/the-laws) (Book X), Plato posited that all movement in the world and the [Cosmos](https://bliptext.com/articles/cosmos) was \"imparted motion\".\nThis required a \"self-originated motion\" to set it in motion and to maintain it.\nIn [Timaeus](https://bliptext.com/articles/timaeus-dialogue), Plato posited a \"demiurge\" of supreme wisdom and intelligence as the creator of the Cosmos.\nAristotle argued against the idea of a first cause, often confused with the idea of a \"prime mover\" or \"[unmoved mover](https://bliptext.com/articles/unmoved-mover)\" (πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον or primus motor) in his [Physics](https://bliptext.com/articles/physics-aristotle) and [Metaphysics](https://bliptext.com/articles/metaphysics-aristotle).\nAristotle argued in favor of the idea of several unmoved movers, one powering each [celestial sphere](https://bliptext.com/articles/celestial-sphere), which he believed lived beyond the sphere of the fixed stars, and explained why motion in the universe (which he believed was eternal) had continued for an infinite period of time.\nAristotle argued the [atomist's](https://bliptext.com/articles/atomism) assertion of a non-eternal universe would require a [first uncaused cause](https://bliptext.com/articles/first-uncaused-cause) – in his terminology, an [efficient](https://bliptext.com/articles/four-causes) first cause – an idea he considered a nonsensical flaw in the reasoning of the atomists.\nLike Plato, Aristotle believed in an eternal [cosmos](https://bliptext.com/articles/cosmos) with no beginning and no end (which in turn follows [Parmenides](https://bliptext.com/articles/parmenides)' famous statement that \"[nothing comes from nothing](https://bliptext.com/articles/nothing-comes-from-nothing)\").\nIn what he called \"first philosophy\" or metaphysics, Aristotle did intend a theological correspondence between the prime mover and a deity; functionally, however, he provided an explanation for the apparent motion of the \"[fixed stars](https://bliptext.com/articles/fixed-stars)\" (now understood as the daily rotation of the Earth).\nAccording to his theses, immaterial unmoved movers are eternal unchangeable beings that constantly think about thinking, but being immaterial, they are incapable of interacting with the cosmos and have no knowledge of what transpires therein.\nFrom an \"aspiration or desire\", the [celestial spheres](https://bliptext.com/articles/celestial-spheres), imitate that purely intellectual activity as best they can, by [uniform circular motion](https://bliptext.com/articles/uniform-circular-motion).\nThe unmoved movers inspiring the [planetary](https://bliptext.com/articles/classical-planets) spheres are no different in kind from the prime mover, they merely suffer a dependency of relation to the prime mover.\nCorrespondingly, the motions of the planets are subordinate to the motion inspired by the prime mover in the sphere of fixed stars.\nAristotle's natural theology admitted no creation or capriciousness from the immortal [pantheon](https://bliptext.com/articles/pantheon-gods), but maintained a defense against dangerous charges of impiety.\n[Plotinus](https://bliptext.com/articles/plotinus), a third-century Platonist, taught that the One transcendent absolute caused the universe to exist simply as a consequence of its existence (creatio ex deo).\nHis disciple Proclus stated \"The One is God\".\nCenturies later, the [Islamic](https://bliptext.com/articles/islamic) [philosopher](https://bliptext.com/articles/philosopher) [Avicenna](https://bliptext.com/articles/avicenna) (c. 980–1037) inquired into the question of [being](https://bliptext.com/articles/being), in which he distinguished between [essence](https://bliptext.com/articles/essence) (māhiyya) and [existence](https://bliptext.com/articles/existence) (wuǧūd).\nHe argued that the fact of existence could not be inferred from or accounted for by the essence of existing things, and that form and matter by themselves could not originate and interact with the movement of the Universe or the progressive actualization of existing things.\nThus, he reasoned that existence must be due to an [agent cause](https://bliptext.com/articles/causality) that necessitates, imparts, gives, or adds existence to an essence.\nTo do so, the cause must coexist with its effect and be an existing thing.\n\n## Early Christian theology\nSteven Duncan writes that the cosmological argument \"was first formulated by a Greek-speaking Syriac Christian neo-Platonist, [John Philoponus](https://bliptext.com/articles/john-philoponus), who claims to find a contradiction between the Greek pagan insistence on the eternity of the world and the Aristotelian rejection of the existence of any actual infinite\".\nReferring to the argument as the \"'[Kalam](https://bliptext.com/articles/kalam)' cosmological argument\", Duncan asserts that it \"received its fullest articulation at the hands of [medieval] Muslim and Jewish exponents of [Kalam](https://bliptext.com/articles/kalam) (\"the use of reason by believers to justify the basic metaphysical presuppositions of the faith\").\n[Thomas Aquinas](https://bliptext.com/articles/thomas-aquinas) (c. 1225–1274) adapted and enhanced the argument he found in his reading of Aristotle, Avicenna (the [Proof of the Truthful](https://bliptext.com/articles/proof-of-the-truthful)), and Maimonides to form one of the most influential versions of the cosmological argument.\nHis conception of first cause was the idea that the Universe must be caused by something that is itself uncaused, which he claimed is that which we call God:\n\"The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false.\nTherefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.\"\nImportantly, Aquinas' Five Ways, given the second question of his [Summa Theologica](https://bliptext.com/articles/summa-theologica), are not the entirety of Aquinas' demonstration that the Christian God exists.\nThe Five Ways form only the beginning of Aquinas' Treatise on the Divine Nature.\n\n# General principles\n\n## The infinite regress\nA regress is a [series](https://bliptext.com/articles/series) of related elements, arranged in some type of sequence of succession, examined in backwards succession (regression) from a fixed point of reference.\nDepending on the type of regress, this retrograde examination may take the form of [recursive](https://bliptext.com/articles/recursion) analysis, in which the elements in a series are studied as products of prior, often simpler, elements.\nIf there is no 'last member' in a regress (ie. no 'first member' in the series) it becomes an [infinite regress](https://bliptext.com/articles/infinite-regress), continuing in perpetuity.\nIn the context of the cosmological argument the term 'regress' usually refers to causal regress, in which the series is a chain of [cause and effect](https://bliptext.com/articles/cause-and-effect), with each element in the series arising from causal activity of the prior member.\nSome variants of the argument may also refer to [temporal](https://bliptext.com/articles/temporal) regress, wherein the elements are past events (discrete units of time) arranged in a [temporal](https://bliptext.com/articles/temporal) sequence.\nAn [infinite regress argument](https://bliptext.com/articles/infinite-regress-argument) attempts to establish the falsity of a proposition by showing that it [entails](https://bliptext.com/articles/logical-consequence) an infinite regress that is [vicious](https://bliptext.com/articles/infinite-regress).\nThe cosmological argument is a type of positive infinite regress argument given that it defends a proposition (in this case, the existence of a [first cause](https://bliptext.com/articles/first-cause)) by arguing that its negation would lead to a vicious regress.\nAn infinite regress may be vicious due to various reasons:\n\n## Accidental and essential ordering of causes\nAquinas refers to the distinction found in Aristotle's [Physics](https://bliptext.com/articles/physics-aristotle) (8.5) that a series of causes may either be [accidental](https://bliptext.com/articles/accident-philosophy) or essential, though the designation of this terminology would follow later under [John Duns Scotus](https://bliptext.com/articles/duns-scotus) at the turn of the 14th century.\nIn an accidentally ordered series of causes, earlier members need not continue exerting causal activity (having done so to progress the chain) for the series to continue.\nFor example, in an ancestral lineage, the ancestors need no longer exist in order for their descendents to resume the bloodline.\nIn an essential series, every prior member must maintain causal interrelationship in order for the series to continue: If a hand holds a stick that moves a rock along the ground, the rock would stop motion as soon as the hand or stick ceases to exist.\nBased upon this distinction [Frederick Copleston](https://bliptext.com/articles/frederick-copleston) (1907-1994) characterises two types of causation: Causes in fieri, which cause an effect's becoming, or coming into existence, and causes in esse, which causally sustain an effect, in being, once it exists.\nTwo specific properties of an essentially ordered series have significance in the context of the cosmological argument:\n[Thomistic](https://bliptext.com/articles/thomism) philosopher, R. P. Phillips comments on the characteristics of essential ordering:\n\n# Versions of the argument\n\n## Aquinas's argument from contingency\nIn the [scholastic](https://bliptext.com/articles/scholasticism) era, [Aquinas](https://bliptext.com/articles/aquinas) formulated the \"argument from [contingency](https://bliptext.com/articles/contingency-philosophy)\", following [Aristotle](https://bliptext.com/articles/aristotle), in claiming that [there must be something to explain the existence of the universe](https://bliptext.com/articles/unmoved-mover).\nSince the universe could, under different circumstances, conceivably not exist (ie. it is contingent) its existence must have a cause.\nThis cause cannot be embodied in another contingent thing, but something that exists by [necessity](https://bliptext.com/articles/inus) (ie. that must exist in order for anything else to exist).\nIt is a form of argument from [universal causation](https://bliptext.com/articles/universal-causation), therefore compatible with the conception of a universe that has no beginning in time.\nIn other words, according to Aquinas, even if the universe has always existed, it still owes its continuing existence to an [uncaused cause](https://bliptext.com/articles/primum-movens), he states: \"... and this we understand to be God.\"\nAquinas's argument from contingency is formulated as the [Third Way](https://bliptext.com/articles/five-ways-aquinas) (Q2, A3) in the [Summa Theologica](https://bliptext.com/articles/summa-theologica).\nIt may be expressed as follows:\nHe concludes thereupon that contingent beings are an insufficient explanation for the existence of other contingent beings.\nFurthermore, that there must exist a [necessary](https://bliptext.com/articles/inus) being, whose non-existence is impossible, to explain the origination of all contingent beings.\n

Therefore, there exists a necessary being.

It is possible that a necessary being has a cause of its necessity in another necessary being.

The derivation of necessity between beings cannot regress to infinity (being an essentially ordered causal series).

Therefore, there exists a being that is necessary of itself, from which all necessity derives.

That being is whom everyone calls God.

\n\n## Leibnizian cosmological argument\nIn 1714, German philosopher [Gottfried Leibniz](https://bliptext.com/articles/gottfried-leibniz) presented a variation of the cosmological argument based upon the [principle of sufficient reason](https://bliptext.com/articles/principle-of-sufficient-reason).\nHe writes: \"There can be found no fact that is true or existent, or any true proposition, without there being a sufficient reason for its being so and not otherwise, although we cannot know these reasons in most cases.\"\nStating his argument succinctly:\n[Alexander Pruss](https://bliptext.com/articles/alexander-pruss) formulates the argument as follows:\nPremise 1 expresses the [principle of sufficient reason](https://bliptext.com/articles/principle-of-sufficient-reason) (PSR).\nIn premise 2, Leibniz proposes the existence of a [logical conjunction](https://bliptext.com/articles/logical-conjunction) of all contingent facts.\nThis may be regarded as the sum total of all contingent reality, referred to in later literature as the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact (BCCF).\nPremise 3 applies the PSR to the BCCF, given that it too, as a contingency, has a sufficient explanation.\nIt follows, in statement 4, that the explanation of the BCCF must be necessary, not contingent, given that the BCCF incorporates all contingent facts.\nStatement 5 proposes that the necessary being explaining the totality of contingent facts is God.\nPhilosophers of religion, such as Joshua Rasmussen and T. Ryan Byerly, have argued in defence of the inference from 4 to 5.\n\n## Duns Scotus's argument\nInspired by Aquinas's [argument of the unmoved mover](https://bliptext.com/articles/five-ways-aquinas), this metaphysical argument for the existence of God was formulated by influential Medieval Christian theologian [Duns Scotus](https://bliptext.com/articles/duns-scotus) (1265/66–1308).\nLike other philosophers and theologians, Scotus believed that his statement for God's existence could be considered separate to that of Aquinas.\nThe form of the argument can be summarised as follows:\n

Each member in an accidentally ordered series (except a possible first) exists via causal activity of a prior member.
That causal activity is exercised by virtue of a certain [form](https://bliptext.com/articles/substantial-form).
Therefore, that form is required by each member to effect causation.
The form itself is not a member of the series.
Therefore [c,d], accidentally ordered causes cannot exist without higher-order (essentially ordered) causes.

An essentially ordered causal series cannot regress to infinity.

Therefore [4,5,6], there exists a first agent.

\nScotus affirms, in premise 5, that an [accidentally ordered series of causes](https://bliptext.com/articles/cosmological-argument) is impossible without higher-order laws and processes that govern the basic nature of all causal activity, which he characterises as essentially ordered causes.\nPremise 6 continues, in accordance with Aquinas's discourses on the [Second Way](https://bliptext.com/articles/five-ways-aquinas) and [Third Way](https://bliptext.com/articles/five-ways-aquinas), that an essentially ordered series of causes cannot be an infinite regress.\nOn this he posits that, if it is merely possible that a first agent exists, then it is [necessarily](https://bliptext.com/articles/logical-consequence) true that a first agent exists, given that the non-existence of a first agent entails the impossibility of its own existence (by virtue of being a first cause in the chain).\nEstablishing this as basis, he argues that it is not impossible for a being to exist that is causeless by virtue of [ontological](https://bliptext.com/articles/ontology) perfection.\nWith the formulation of this argument, Scotus establishes the first component of his 'triple primacy': The characterisation of a being that is first in [efficient causality](https://bliptext.com/articles/four-causes), [final causality](https://bliptext.com/articles/four-causes) and pre-eminence, or maximal excellence, which he ascribes to God.\n\n## Kalam cosmological argument\nA modern formulation of the cosmological argument that proposes, as its central thesis, the impossibility of an infinite [temporal](https://bliptext.com/articles/temporal) regress of events (or a past-eternal universe).\nIts [premises](https://bliptext.com/articles/premises) defend the [finitude of the past](https://bliptext.com/articles/temporal-finitism) through both philosophical and scientific arguments.\nMany of these ideas originate in the writings of early Christian theologian [John Philoponus](https://bliptext.com/articles/john-philoponus) (490–570 AD), developed within the proceedings of medieval [Islamic](https://bliptext.com/articles/islam) [scholasticism](https://bliptext.com/articles/scholasticism) through the 9th to 12th centuries, eventually returning to [Christian theological](https://bliptext.com/articles/christian-theological) scholarship in the 13th century.\nThey were revitalised for modern academic discourse by philosopher and theologian [William Lane Craig](https://bliptext.com/articles/william-lane-craig) through publications such as [The Kalām Cosmological Argument](https://bliptext.com/articles/the-kal-m-cosmological-argument) (1979) and the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (2009).\nThe form of the argument popularised by Craig is expressed in two parts, as an initial [deductive](https://bliptext.com/articles/deductive-argument) [syllogism](https://bliptext.com/articles/syllogism) followed by philosophical analysis of its conclusion.\n\n### Initial syllogism\n\n### Philosophical analysis of the conclusion\nCraig argues that the cause of the universe [necessarily](https://bliptext.com/articles/logical-entailment) embodies specific properties in creating the universe [ex nihilo](https://bliptext.com/articles/creatio-ex-nihilo) and in effecting creation from a timeless state (implying [free agency](https://bliptext.com/articles/agent-causation)).\nBased upon this analysis, he appends a further premise and conclusion:\n

If the universe has a cause, then an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists who [sans](https://bliptext.com/articles/sans) (without) the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful.

Therefore, an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful.

\n\nFor scientific evidence of the finitude of the past, Craig appeals to the [Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem](https://bliptext.com/articles/borde-guth-vilenkin-theorem), which posits a past boundary to [cosmic inflation](https://bliptext.com/articles/cosmic-inflation), and the general consensus on the standard model of cosmology, referring to the origin of the universe in the [Big Bang](https://bliptext.com/articles/big-bang).\nFor philosophical evidence, he cites the [Hilbert's Hotel](https://bliptext.com/articles/hilbert-s-paradox-of-the-grand-hotel) [thought experiment](https://bliptext.com/articles/thought-experiment) and the [tale of Tristram Shandy](https://bliptext.com/articles/the-life-and-opinions-of-tristram-shandy-gentleman) as proofs (respectively) of the impossibility of [actual infinities](https://bliptext.com/articles/actual-infinities) existing in reality and of forming an actual infinite by successive addition.\nHe concludes that past events, comprising a series of events that are, (a) instantiated in reality, (b) formed by successive addition, cannot be actually infinite.\nHe remarks upon the [theological](https://bliptext.com/articles/theology) implications that follow from the final conclusion of this argument:\n\n# Criticism and discourse\n\n## \"What caused the first cause?\"\nOne objection to the argument asks why a first cause is unique in that it does not require any causes.\nProponents argue that the first cause is exempt from having a cause, as this is part of what it is to be the first cause, while opponents argue that this is [special pleading](https://bliptext.com/articles/special-pleading) or otherwise untrue.\nCritics often press that arguing for the first cause's exemption raises the question of why the first cause is indeed exempt, whereas defenders maintain that this question has been answered by the various arguments, emphasizing that none of the major cosmological arguments rests on the premise that everything has a cause, and so the question does not address the actual premises of an argument and rests on a misunderstanding of them.\nAndrew Loke states that, according to the [Kalam cosmological argument](https://bliptext.com/articles/kalam-cosmological-argument), only things which begin to exist require a cause.\nOn the other hand, something that is without beginning has always existed and therefore does not require a cause.\nLoke and [William Lane Craig](https://bliptext.com/articles/william-lane-craig) argue that an infinite regress of causes is impossible, therefore, that there must be a first uncaused cause, even if one posits a plurality of causes of the universe.\nCraig argues further that [Occam's razor](https://bliptext.com/articles/occam-s-razor) may be employed to remove unneeded further causes of the universe to leave a single uncaused cause.\n\n## \"Why can't the universe be causeless?\"\nIt is argued that the premise of [causality](https://bliptext.com/articles/causality) has been arrived at via [a posteriori](https://bliptext.com/articles/empirical-evidence) ([inductive](https://bliptext.com/articles/inductive-reasoning)) reasoning, which is dependent on experience.\n[David Hume](https://bliptext.com/articles/david-hume) highlighted this [problem of induction](https://bliptext.com/articles/problem-of-induction) and argued that [causal relations](https://bliptext.com/articles/causality) are not true [a priori](https://bliptext.com/articles/a-priori-and-a-posteriori).\nHowever, as to whether inductive or [deductive reasoning](https://bliptext.com/articles/deductive-reasoning) is more valuable remains a matter of debate, with the general conclusion being that neither is prominent.\nOpponents of the cosmological argument argue that it is unwise to draw conclusions from an extrapolation of causality beyond experience, therefore, that the causal principle does not apply to the origin of the universe.\nPhilosopher [Robert Koons](https://bliptext.com/articles/robert-koons) argues that to deny causation is to deny all empirical ideas – for example, if we know our own hand, we know it because of the chain of causes including light being reflected upon one's eyes, stimulating the retina and sending a message through the optic nerve into your brain.\nHe summarised the purpose of the argument as \"that if you don't buy into theistic metaphysics, you're undermining empirical science. The two grew up together historically and are culturally and philosophically inter-dependent ... If you say I just don't buy this causality principle – that's going to be a big big problem for empirical science.\"\n\n## \"Why should the cause be God?\"\nAccording to this objection, the basic cosmological argument merely establishes that a first cause exists, not that it has the attributes of a [theistic](https://bliptext.com/articles/theistic) god, such as [omniscience](https://bliptext.com/articles/omniscience), [omnipotence](https://bliptext.com/articles/omnipotence), and [omnibenevolence](https://bliptext.com/articles/omnibenevolence).\nThis is why the argument is often expanded to assert that at least some of these attributes are necessarily true, for instance in the modern Kalam argument given above.\nDefenders of the cosmological arguments also reply that theologians of note are aware of the need to additionally prove other attributes of the first cause beyond that one exists.\nOne notable example of this is found in Aquinas' Summa Theologiae in which much of the first part (Prima Pars) is devoted to establishing the attributes of this first cause, such as its uniqueness, perfection, and intelligence.\nThus defenders of cosmological arguments would reply that while it is true that the cosmological argument only establishes a first cause, this is merely the first step which then allows for the demonstration of the other theistic attributes.\n\n## Timeless origin of the universe\nSome cosmologists and physicists, such as [Carlo Rovelli](https://bliptext.com/articles/carlo-rovelli), argue that a challenge to the cosmological argument is the nature of time: \"One finds that time just disappears from the [Wheeler–DeWitt equation](https://bliptext.com/articles/wheeler-dewitt-equation).\"\nThe [Big Bang theory](https://bliptext.com/articles/big-bang-theory) states that it is the point in which all [dimensions](https://bliptext.com/articles/dimension) came into existence, the start of both [space](https://bliptext.com/articles/space) and [time](https://bliptext.com/articles/time).\nThen, the question \"What was there before the Universe?\"\nmakes no sense; the concept of \"before\" becomes meaningless when considering a situation without time.\nThis has been put forward by J. Richard Gott III, [James E. Gunn](https://bliptext.com/articles/james-gunn-astronomer), David N. Schramm, and [Beatrice Tinsley](https://bliptext.com/articles/beatrice-tinsley), who said that asking what occurred before the Big Bang is like asking what is north of the [North Pole](https://bliptext.com/articles/north-pole).\nHowever, some cosmologists and physicists attempt to investigate causes for the Big Bang, using such scenarios as the collision of [membranes](https://bliptext.com/articles/membrane-m-theory).\nPhilosopher [Edward Feser](https://bliptext.com/articles/edward-feser) argues that most of the classical philosophers' cosmological arguments for the existence of God do not depend on the Big Bang or whether the universe had a beginning.\nThe question is not about what got things started, or how long they have been going, but rather what keeps them going.\n\n## Avoiding an infinite regress\n[David Hume](https://bliptext.com/articles/david-hume) and later [Paul Edwards](https://bliptext.com/articles/paul-edwards-philosopher) have invoked a similar principle in their criticisms of the cosmological argument.\n[William L. Rowe](https://bliptext.com/articles/william-l-rowe) has called this the Hume-Edwards principle:\n\"If the existence of every member of a set is explained, the existence of that set is thereby explained.\"\nNevertheless, David White argues that the notion of an [infinite causal regress](https://bliptext.com/articles/infinite-regress) providing a proper explanation is fallacious.\nFurthermore, in Hume's [Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion](https://bliptext.com/articles/dialogues-concerning-natural-religion), the character Demea states that even if the succession of causes is infinite, the whole chain still requires a cause.\nTo explain this, suppose there exists a causal chain of infinite contingent beings.\nIf one asks the question, \"Why are there any contingent beings at all?\", it does not help to be told that \"There are contingent beings because other contingent beings caused them.\"\nThat answer would just presuppose additional contingent beings.\nAn adequate explanation of why some contingent beings exist would invoke a different sort of being, a necessary being that is not contingent.\nA response might suppose each individual is contingent but the infinite chain as a whole is not, or the whole infinite causal chain is its own cause.\nEdward Feser argues that an essentially ordered series of causes cannot regress to infinity, even if it may be theoretically possible for accidentally ordered causes to do so.\nSeverinsen argues that there is an \"infinite\" and complex causal structure.\nWhite tried to introduce an argument \"without appeal to the principle of sufficient reason and without denying the possibility of an infinite causal regress\".\nA number of other arguments have been offered to demonstrate that an actual infinite regress cannot exist, viz.\nthe argument for the impossibility of concrete actual infinities, the argument for the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite, the argument from the lack of capacity to begin to exist, and various arguments from paradoxes.\n\n## Causal loop arguments\nSome objections to the cosmological argument refer to the possibility of loops in the structure of [cause and effect](https://bliptext.com/articles/causality) that would avoid the need for a First Cause.\nGott and Li refer to the curvature of [spacetime](https://bliptext.com/articles/spacetime) and [closed timelike curves](https://bliptext.com/articles/closed-timelike-curve) as possible mechanisms by which the universe may bring about its own existence.\n[Richard Hanley](https://bliptext.com/articles/richard-hanley) contends that causal loops are neither logically nor physically impossible, remarking: \"[In timed systems] the only possibly objectionable feature that all causal loops share is that coincidence is required to explain them.\"\nHowever, Andrew Loke argues that there is insufficient evidence to postulate a causal loop of the type that would avoid a First Cause.\nHe asserts that such a mechanism would suffer from the problem of [vicious circularity](https://bliptext.com/articles/temporal-paradox), rendering it [metaphysically](https://bliptext.com/articles/metaphysics) impossible.","current_revision":null,"created_by":"kACnuQmH5k9Nr5VNVEpVeg7XpvUmMctD","created_at":"2025-01-25T16:32:53.173Z","updated_at":"2025-01-25T16:32:53.173Z","search_vector":"'argument':2 'cosmolog':1","search_content":" \n \n\n# \nIn the [philosophy of religion](https://bliptext.com/articles/philosophy-of-religion), a **cosmological argument** is an argument for the existence of [God](https://bliptext.com/articles/god) based upon [observational](https://bliptext.com/articles/observation) and [factual](https://bliptext.com/articles/fact) statements concerning the [universe](https://bliptext.com/articles/universe) (or some general category of its [natural](https://bliptext.com/articles/natural) contents) typically in the context of [causation](https://bliptext.com/articles/cause-and-effect), change, contingency or finitude.\nIn referring to [reason](https://bliptext.com/articles/reason) and observation alone for its [premises](https://bliptext.com/articles/premises), and precluding [revelation](https://bliptext.com/articles/revelation), this category of argument falls within the domain of [natural theology](https://bliptext.com/articles/natural-theology).\nA cosmological argument can also sometimes be referred to as an **argument from universal causation**, an **argument from first cause**, the **causal argument** or the **prime mover argument**.\nThe concept of causation is a principal underpinning idea in all cosmological arguments, particularly in affirming the necessity for a [First Cause](https://bliptext.com/articles/first-cause).\nThe latter is typically determined in [philosophical analysis](https://bliptext.com/articles/philosophical-analysis) to be [God](https://bliptext.com/articles/god), as identified within [classical conceptions of theism](https://bliptext.com/articles/classical-theism).\nThe origins of the argument date back to at least [Aristotle](https://bliptext.com/articles/aristotle), developed subsequently within the scholarly traditions of [Neoplatonism](https://bliptext.com/articles/neoplatonism) and [early Christianity](https://bliptext.com/articles/early-christianity), and later under medieval [Islamic](https://bliptext.com/articles/muslim) [scholasticism](https://bliptext.com/articles/scholasticism) through the 9th to 12th centuries.\nIt would eventually be re-introduced to Christian theology in the 13th century by [Thomas Aquinas](https://bliptext.com/articles/thomas-aquinas).\nIn the 18th century, it would become associated with the [principle of sufficient reason](https://bliptext.com/articles/principle-of-sufficient-reason) formulated by [Gottfried Leibniz](https://bliptext.com/articles/gottfried-leibniz) and [Samuel Clarke](https://bliptext.com/articles/samuel-clarke), itself an exposition of the [Parmenidean](https://bliptext.com/articles/parmenides) causal principle that \"[nothing comes from nothing](https://bliptext.com/articles/creatio-ex-materia)\".\n[Contemporary](https://bliptext.com/articles/contemporary-philosophy) defenders of cosmological arguments include [William Lane Craig](https://bliptext.com/articles/william-lane-craig), [Robert Koons](https://bliptext.com/articles/robert-koons), [John Lennox](https://bliptext.com/articles/john-lennox), [Stephen Meyer](https://bliptext.com/articles/stephen-meyer), and [Alexander Pruss](https://bliptext.com/articles/alexander-pruss).\n\n# History\n# [Plato and Aristotle, depicted here in Raphael's The School of Athens, both developed first cause arguments. | upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/98/Sanzio///01///Plato///Aristotle.jpg]\n\n## Classical philosophy\n[Plato](https://bliptext.com/articles/plato) (c. 427–347 BC) and [Aristotle](https://bliptext.com/articles/aristotle) (c. 384–322 BC) both posited first cause arguments, though each had certain notable caveats.\nIn [The Laws](https://bliptext.com/articles/the-laws) (Book X), Plato posited that all movement in the world and the [Cosmos](https://bliptext.com/articles/cosmos) was \"imparted motion\".\nThis required a \"self-originated motion\" to set it in motion and to maintain it.\nIn [Timaeus](https://bliptext.com/articles/timaeus-dialogue), Plato posited a \"demiurge\" of supreme wisdom and intelligence as the creator of the Cosmos.\nAristotle argued against the idea of a first cause, often confused with the idea of a \"prime mover\" or \"[unmoved mover](https://bliptext.com/articles/unmoved-mover)\" (πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον or primus motor) in his [Physics](https://bliptext.com/articles/physics-aristotle) and [Metaphysics](https://bliptext.com/articles/metaphysics-aristotle).\nAristotle argued in favor of the idea of several unmoved movers, one powering each [celestial sphere](https://bliptext.com/articles/celestial-sphere), which he believed lived beyond the sphere of the fixed stars, and explained why motion in the universe (which he believed was eternal) had continued for an infinite period of time.\nAristotle argued the [atomist's](https://bliptext.com/articles/atomism) assertion of a non-eternal universe would require a [first uncaused cause](https://bliptext.com/articles/first-uncaused-cause) – in his terminology, an [efficient](https://bliptext.com/articles/four-causes) first cause – an idea he considered a nonsensical flaw in the reasoning of the atomists.\nLike Plato, Aristotle believed in an eternal [cosmos](https://bliptext.com/articles/cosmos) with no beginning and no end (which in turn follows [Parmenides](https://bliptext.com/articles/parmenides)' famous statement that \"[nothing comes from nothing](https://bliptext.com/articles/nothing-comes-from-nothing)\").\nIn what he called \"first philosophy\" or metaphysics, Aristotle did intend a theological correspondence between the prime mover and a deity; functionally, however, he provided an explanation for the apparent motion of the \"[fixed stars](https://bliptext.com/articles/fixed-stars)\" (now understood as the daily rotation of the Earth).\nAccording to his theses, immaterial unmoved movers are eternal unchangeable beings that constantly think about thinking, but being immaterial, they are incapable of interacting with the cosmos and have no knowledge of what transpires therein.\nFrom an \"aspiration or desire\", the [celestial spheres](https://bliptext.com/articles/celestial-spheres), imitate that purely intellectual activity as best they can, by [uniform circular motion](https://bliptext.com/articles/uniform-circular-motion).\nThe unmoved movers inspiring the [planetary](https://bliptext.com/articles/classical-planets) spheres are no different in kind from the prime mover, they merely suffer a dependency of relation to the prime mover.\nCorrespondingly, the motions of the planets are subordinate to the motion inspired by the prime mover in the sphere of fixed stars.\nAristotle's natural theology admitted no creation or capriciousness from the immortal [pantheon](https://bliptext.com/articles/pantheon-gods), but maintained a defense against dangerous charges of impiety.\n[Plotinus](https://bliptext.com/articles/plotinus), a third-century Platonist, taught that the One transcendent absolute caused the universe to exist simply as a consequence of its existence (creatio ex deo).\nHis disciple Proclus stated \"The One is God\".\nCenturies later, the [Islamic](https://bliptext.com/articles/islamic) [philosopher](https://bliptext.com/articles/philosopher) [Avicenna](https://bliptext.com/articles/avicenna) (c. 980–1037) inquired into the question of [being](https://bliptext.com/articles/being), in which he distinguished between [essence](https://bliptext.com/articles/essence) (māhiyya) and [existence](https://bliptext.com/articles/existence) (wuǧūd).\nHe argued that the fact of existence could not be inferred from or accounted for by the essence of existing things, and that form and matter by themselves could not originate and interact with the movement of the Universe or the progressive actualization of existing things.\nThus, he reasoned that existence must be due to an [agent cause](https://bliptext.com/articles/causality) that necessitates, imparts, gives, or adds existence to an essence.\nTo do so, the cause must coexist with its effect and be an existing thing.\n\n## Early Christian theology\nSteven Duncan writes that the cosmological argument \"was first formulated by a Greek-speaking Syriac Christian neo-Platonist, [John Philoponus](https://bliptext.com/articles/john-philoponus), who claims to find a contradiction between the Greek pagan insistence on the eternity of the world and the Aristotelian rejection of the existence of any actual infinite\".\nReferring to the argument as the \"'[Kalam](https://bliptext.com/articles/kalam)' cosmological argument\", Duncan asserts that it \"received its fullest articulation at the hands of [medieval] Muslim and Jewish exponents of [Kalam](https://bliptext.com/articles/kalam) (\"the use of reason by believers to justify the basic metaphysical presuppositions of the faith\").\n[Thomas Aquinas](https://bliptext.com/articles/thomas-aquinas) (c. 1225–1274) adapted and enhanced the argument he found in his reading of Aristotle, Avicenna (the [Proof of the Truthful](https://bliptext.com/articles/proof-of-the-truthful)), and Maimonides to form one of the most influential versions of the cosmological argument.\nHis conception of first cause was the idea that the Universe must be caused by something that is itself uncaused, which he claimed is that which we call God:\n\"The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false.\nTherefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.\"\nImportantly, Aquinas' Five Ways, given the second question of his [Summa Theologica](https://bliptext.com/articles/summa-theologica), are not the entirety of Aquinas' demonstration that the Christian God exists.\nThe Five Ways form only the beginning of Aquinas' Treatise on the Divine Nature.\n\n# General principles\n\n## The infinite regress\nA regress is a [series](https://bliptext.com/articles/series) of related elements, arranged in some type of sequence of succession, examined in backwards succession (regression) from a fixed point of reference.\nDepending on the type of regress, this retrograde examination may take the form of [recursive](https://bliptext.com/articles/recursion) analysis, in which the elements in a series are studied as products of prior, often simpler, elements.\nIf there is no 'last member' in a regress (ie. no 'first member' in the series) it becomes an [infinite regress](https://bliptext.com/articles/infinite-regress), continuing in perpetuity.\nIn the context of the cosmological argument the term 'regress' usually refers to causal regress, in which the series is a chain of [cause and effect](https://bliptext.com/articles/cause-and-effect), with each element in the series arising from causal activity of the prior member.\nSome variants of the argument may also refer to [temporal](https://bliptext.com/articles/temporal) regress, wherein the elements are past events (discrete units of time) arranged in a [temporal](https://bliptext.com/articles/temporal) sequence.\nAn [infinite regress argument](https://bliptext.com/articles/infinite-regress-argument) attempts to establish the falsity of a proposition by showing that it [entails](https://bliptext.com/articles/logical-consequence) an infinite regress that is [vicious](https://bliptext.com/articles/infinite-regress).\nThe cosmological argument is a type of positive infinite regress argument given that it defends a proposition (in this case, the existence of a [first cause](https://bliptext.com/articles/first-cause)) by arguing that its negation would lead to a vicious regress.\nAn infinite regress may be vicious due to various reasons:\n\n## Accidental and essential ordering of causes\nAquinas refers to the distinction found in Aristotle's [Physics](https://bliptext.com/articles/physics-aristotle) (8.5) that a series of causes may either be [accidental](https://bliptext.com/articles/accident-philosophy) or essential, though the designation of this terminology would follow later under [John Duns Scotus](https://bliptext.com/articles/duns-scotus) at the turn of the 14th century.\nIn an accidentally ordered series of causes, earlier members need not continue exerting causal activity (having done so to progress the chain) for the series to continue.\nFor example, in an ancestral lineage, the ancestors need no longer exist in order for their descendents to resume the bloodline.\nIn an essential series, every prior member must maintain causal interrelationship in order for the series to continue: If a hand holds a stick that moves a rock along the ground, the rock would stop motion as soon as the hand or stick ceases to exist.\nBased upon this distinction [Frederick Copleston](https://bliptext.com/articles/frederick-copleston) (1907-1994) characterises two types of causation: Causes in fieri, which cause an effect's becoming, or coming into existence, and causes in esse, which causally sustain an effect, in being, once it exists.\nTwo specific properties of an essentially ordered series have significance in the context of the cosmological argument:\n[Thomistic](https://bliptext.com/articles/thomism) philosopher, R. P. Phillips comments on the characteristics of essential ordering:\n\n# Versions of the argument\n\n## Aquinas's argument from contingency\nIn the [scholastic](https://bliptext.com/articles/scholasticism) era, [Aquinas](https://bliptext.com/articles/aquinas) formulated the \"argument from [contingency](https://bliptext.com/articles/contingency-philosophy)\", following [Aristotle](https://bliptext.com/articles/aristotle), in claiming that [there must be something to explain the existence of the universe](https://bliptext.com/articles/unmoved-mover).\nSince the universe could, under different circumstances, conceivably not exist (ie. it is contingent) its existence must have a cause.\nThis cause cannot be embodied in another contingent thing, but something that exists by [necessity](https://bliptext.com/articles/inus) (ie. that must exist in order for anything else to exist).\nIt is a form of argument from [universal causation](https://bliptext.com/articles/universal-causation), therefore compatible with the conception of a universe that has no beginning in time.\nIn other words, according to Aquinas, even if the universe has always existed, it still owes its continuing existence to an [uncaused cause](https://bliptext.com/articles/primum-movens), he states: \"... and this we understand to be God.\"\nAquinas's argument from contingency is formulated as the [Third Way](https://bliptext.com/articles/five-ways-aquinas) (Q2, A3) in the [Summa Theologica](https://bliptext.com/articles/summa-theologica).\nIt may be expressed as follows:\nHe concludes thereupon that contingent beings are an insufficient explanation for the existence of other contingent beings.\nFurthermore, that there must exist a [necessary](https://bliptext.com/articles/inus) being, whose non-existence is impossible, to explain the origination of all contingent beings.\n Therefore, there exists a necessary being. \n It is possible that a necessary being has a cause of its necessity in another necessary being. \n The derivation of necessity between beings cannot regress to infinity (being an essentially ordered causal series). \n Therefore, there exists a being that is necessary of itself, from which all necessity derives. \n That being is whom everyone calls God. \n\n## Leibnizian cosmological argument\nIn 1714, German philosopher [Gottfried Leibniz](https://bliptext.com/articles/gottfried-leibniz) presented a variation of the cosmological argument based upon the [principle of sufficient reason](https://bliptext.com/articles/principle-of-sufficient-reason).\nHe writes: \"There can be found no fact that is true or existent, or any true proposition, without there being a sufficient reason for its being so and not otherwise, although we cannot know these reasons in most cases.\"\nStating his argument succinctly:\n[Alexander Pruss](https://bliptext.com/articles/alexander-pruss) formulates the argument as follows:\nPremise 1 expresses the [principle of sufficient reason](https://bliptext.com/articles/principle-of-sufficient-reason) (PSR).\nIn premise 2, Leibniz proposes the existence of a [logical conjunction](https://bliptext.com/articles/logical-conjunction) of all contingent facts.\nThis may be regarded as the sum total of all contingent reality, referred to in later literature as the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact (BCCF).\nPremise 3 applies the PSR to the BCCF, given that it too, as a contingency, has a sufficient explanation.\nIt follows, in statement 4, that the explanation of the BCCF must be necessary, not contingent, given that the BCCF incorporates all contingent facts.\nStatement 5 proposes that the necessary being explaining the totality of contingent facts is God.\nPhilosophers of religion, such as Joshua Rasmussen and T. Ryan Byerly, have argued in defence of the inference from 4 to 5.\n\n## Duns Scotus's argument\nInspired by Aquinas's [argument of the unmoved mover](https://bliptext.com/articles/five-ways-aquinas), this metaphysical argument for the existence of God was formulated by influential Medieval Christian theologian [Duns Scotus](https://bliptext.com/articles/duns-scotus) (1265/66–1308).\nLike other philosophers and theologians, Scotus believed that his statement for God's existence could be considered separate to that of Aquinas.\nThe form of the argument can be summarised as follows:\n \n Each member in an accidentally ordered series (except a possible first) exists via causal activity of a prior member. \n That causal activity is exercised by virtue of a certain [form](https://bliptext.com/articles/substantial-form). \n Therefore, that form is required by each member to effect causation. \n The form itself is not a member of the series. \n Therefore [c,d], accidentally ordered causes cannot exist without higher-order (essentially ordered) causes. \n \n An essentially ordered causal series cannot regress to infinity. \n Therefore [4,5,6], there exists a first agent. \nScotus affirms, in premise 5, that an [accidentally ordered series of causes](https://bliptext.com/articles/cosmological-argument) is impossible without higher-order laws and processes that govern the basic nature of all causal activity, which he characterises as essentially ordered causes.\nPremise 6 continues, in accordance with Aquinas's discourses on the [Second Way](https://bliptext.com/articles/five-ways-aquinas) and [Third Way](https://bliptext.com/articles/five-ways-aquinas), that an essentially ordered series of causes cannot be an infinite regress.\nOn this he posits that, if it is merely possible that a first agent exists, then it is [necessarily](https://bliptext.com/articles/logical-consequence) true that a first agent exists, given that the non-existence of a first agent entails the impossibility of its own existence (by virtue of being a first cause in the chain).\nEstablishing this as basis, he argues that it is not impossible for a being to exist that is causeless by virtue of [ontological](https://bliptext.com/articles/ontology) perfection.\nWith the formulation of this argument, Scotus establishes the first component of his 'triple primacy': The characterisation of a being that is first in [efficient causality](https://bliptext.com/articles/four-causes), [final causality](https://bliptext.com/articles/four-causes) and pre-eminence, or maximal excellence, which he ascribes to God.\n\n## Kalam cosmological argument\nA modern formulation of the cosmological argument that proposes, as its central thesis, the impossibility of an infinite [temporal](https://bliptext.com/articles/temporal) regress of events (or a past-eternal universe).\nIts [premises](https://bliptext.com/articles/premises) defend the [finitude of the past](https://bliptext.com/articles/temporal-finitism) through both philosophical and scientific arguments.\nMany of these ideas originate in the writings of early Christian theologian [John Philoponus](https://bliptext.com/articles/john-philoponus) (490–570 AD), developed within the proceedings of medieval [Islamic](https://bliptext.com/articles/islam) [scholasticism](https://bliptext.com/articles/scholasticism) through the 9th to 12th centuries, eventually returning to [Christian theological](https://bliptext.com/articles/christian-theological) scholarship in the 13th century.\nThey were revitalised for modern academic discourse by philosopher and theologian [William Lane Craig](https://bliptext.com/articles/william-lane-craig) through publications such as [The Kalām Cosmological Argument](https://bliptext.com/articles/the-kal-m-cosmological-argument) (1979) and the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (2009).\nThe form of the argument popularised by Craig is expressed in two parts, as an initial [deductive](https://bliptext.com/articles/deductive-argument) [syllogism](https://bliptext.com/articles/syllogism) followed by philosophical analysis of its conclusion.\n\n### Initial syllogism\n\n### Philosophical analysis of the conclusion\nCraig argues that the cause of the universe [necessarily](https://bliptext.com/articles/logical-entailment) embodies specific properties in creating the universe [ex nihilo](https://bliptext.com/articles/creatio-ex-nihilo) and in effecting creation from a timeless state (implying [free agency](https://bliptext.com/articles/agent-causation)).\nBased upon this analysis, he appends a further premise and conclusion:\n If the universe has a cause, then an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists who [sans](https://bliptext.com/articles/sans) (without) the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful. \n Therefore, an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful. \n \nFor scientific evidence of the finitude of the past, Craig appeals to the [Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem](https://bliptext.com/articles/borde-guth-vilenkin-theorem), which posits a past boundary to [cosmic inflation](https://bliptext.com/articles/cosmic-inflation), and the general consensus on the standard model of cosmology, referring to the origin of the universe in the [Big Bang](https://bliptext.com/articles/big-bang).\nFor philosophical evidence, he cites the [Hilbert's Hotel](https://bliptext.com/articles/hilbert-s-paradox-of-the-grand-hotel) [thought experiment](https://bliptext.com/articles/thought-experiment) and the [tale of Tristram Shandy](https://bliptext.com/articles/the-life-and-opinions-of-tristram-shandy-gentleman) as proofs (respectively) of the impossibility of [actual infinities](https://bliptext.com/articles/actual-infinities) existing in reality and of forming an actual infinite by successive addition.\nHe concludes that past events, comprising a series of events that are, (a) instantiated in reality, (b) formed by successive addition, cannot be actually infinite.\nHe remarks upon the [theological](https://bliptext.com/articles/theology) implications that follow from the final conclusion of this argument:\n\n# Criticism and discourse\n\n## \"What caused the first cause?\"\nOne objection to the argument asks why a first cause is unique in that it does not require any causes.\nProponents argue that the first cause is exempt from having a cause, as this is part of what it is to be the first cause, while opponents argue that this is [special pleading](https://bliptext.com/articles/special-pleading) or otherwise untrue.\nCritics often press that arguing for the first cause's exemption raises the question of why the first cause is indeed exempt, whereas defenders maintain that this question has been answered by the various arguments, emphasizing that none of the major cosmological arguments rests on the premise that everything has a cause, and so the question does not address the actual premises of an argument and rests on a misunderstanding of them.\nAndrew Loke states that, according to the [Kalam cosmological argument](https://bliptext.com/articles/kalam-cosmological-argument), only things which begin to exist require a cause.\nOn the other hand, something that is without beginning has always existed and therefore does not require a cause.\nLoke and [William Lane Craig](https://bliptext.com/articles/william-lane-craig) argue that an infinite regress of causes is impossible, therefore, that there must be a first uncaused cause, even if one posits a plurality of causes of the universe.\nCraig argues further that [Occam's razor](https://bliptext.com/articles/occam-s-razor) may be employed to remove unneeded further causes of the universe to leave a single uncaused cause.\n\n## \"Why can't the universe be causeless?\"\nIt is argued that the premise of [causality](https://bliptext.com/articles/causality) has been arrived at via [a posteriori](https://bliptext.com/articles/empirical-evidence) ([inductive](https://bliptext.com/articles/inductive-reasoning)) reasoning, which is dependent on experience.\n[David Hume](https://bliptext.com/articles/david-hume) highlighted this [problem of induction](https://bliptext.com/articles/problem-of-induction) and argued that [causal relations](https://bliptext.com/articles/causality) are not true [a priori](https://bliptext.com/articles/a-priori-and-a-posteriori).\nHowever, as to whether inductive or [deductive reasoning](https://bliptext.com/articles/deductive-reasoning) is more valuable remains a matter of debate, with the general conclusion being that neither is prominent.\nOpponents of the cosmological argument argue that it is unwise to draw conclusions from an extrapolation of causality beyond experience, therefore, that the causal principle does not apply to the origin of the universe.\nPhilosopher [Robert Koons](https://bliptext.com/articles/robert-koons) argues that to deny causation is to deny all empirical ideas – for example, if we know our own hand, we know it because of the chain of causes including light being reflected upon one's eyes, stimulating the retina and sending a message through the optic nerve into your brain.\nHe summarised the purpose of the argument as \"that if you don't buy into theistic metaphysics, you're undermining empirical science. The two grew up together historically and are culturally and philosophically inter-dependent ... If you say I just don't buy this causality principle – that's going to be a big big problem for empirical science.\"\n\n## \"Why should the cause be God?\"\nAccording to this objection, the basic cosmological argument merely establishes that a first cause exists, not that it has the attributes of a [theistic](https://bliptext.com/articles/theistic) god, such as [omniscience](https://bliptext.com/articles/omniscience), [omnipotence](https://bliptext.com/articles/omnipotence), and [omnibenevolence](https://bliptext.com/articles/omnibenevolence).\nThis is why the argument is often expanded to assert that at least some of these attributes are necessarily true, for instance in the modern Kalam argument given above.\nDefenders of the cosmological arguments also reply that theologians of note are aware of the need to additionally prove other attributes of the first cause beyond that one exists.\nOne notable example of this is found in Aquinas' Summa Theologiae in which much of the first part (Prima Pars) is devoted to establishing the attributes of this first cause, such as its uniqueness, perfection, and intelligence.\nThus defenders of cosmological arguments would reply that while it is true that the cosmological argument only establishes a first cause, this is merely the first step which then allows for the demonstration of the other theistic attributes.\n\n## Timeless origin of the universe\nSome cosmologists and physicists, such as [Carlo Rovelli](https://bliptext.com/articles/carlo-rovelli), argue that a challenge to the cosmological argument is the nature of time: \"One finds that time just disappears from the [Wheeler–DeWitt equation](https://bliptext.com/articles/wheeler-dewitt-equation).\"\nThe [Big Bang theory](https://bliptext.com/articles/big-bang-theory) states that it is the point in which all [dimensions](https://bliptext.com/articles/dimension) came into existence, the start of both [space](https://bliptext.com/articles/space) and [time](https://bliptext.com/articles/time).\nThen, the question \"What was there before the Universe?\"\nmakes no sense; the concept of \"before\" becomes meaningless when considering a situation without time.\nThis has been put forward by J. Richard Gott III, [James E. Gunn](https://bliptext.com/articles/james-gunn-astronomer), David N. Schramm, and [Beatrice Tinsley](https://bliptext.com/articles/beatrice-tinsley), who said that asking what occurred before the Big Bang is like asking what is north of the [North Pole](https://bliptext.com/articles/north-pole).\nHowever, some cosmologists and physicists attempt to investigate causes for the Big Bang, using such scenarios as the collision of [membranes](https://bliptext.com/articles/membrane-m-theory).\nPhilosopher [Edward Feser](https://bliptext.com/articles/edward-feser) argues that most of the classical philosophers' cosmological arguments for the existence of God do not depend on the Big Bang or whether the universe had a beginning.\nThe question is not about what got things started, or how long they have been going, but rather what keeps them going.\n\n## Avoiding an infinite regress\n[David Hume](https://bliptext.com/articles/david-hume) and later [Paul Edwards](https://bliptext.com/articles/paul-edwards-philosopher) have invoked a similar principle in their criticisms of the cosmological argument.\n[William L. Rowe](https://bliptext.com/articles/william-l-rowe) has called this the Hume-Edwards principle:\n\"If the existence of every member of a set is explained, the existence of that set is thereby explained.\"\nNevertheless, David White argues that the notion of an [infinite causal regress](https://bliptext.com/articles/infinite-regress) providing a proper explanation is fallacious.\nFurthermore, in Hume's [Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion](https://bliptext.com/articles/dialogues-concerning-natural-religion), the character Demea states that even if the succession of causes is infinite, the whole chain still requires a cause.\nTo explain this, suppose there exists a causal chain of infinite contingent beings.\nIf one asks the question, \"Why are there any contingent beings at all?\", it does not help to be told that \"There are contingent beings because other contingent beings caused them.\"\nThat answer would just presuppose additional contingent beings.\nAn adequate explanation of why some contingent beings exist would invoke a different sort of being, a necessary being that is not contingent.\nA response might suppose each individual is contingent but the infinite chain as a whole is not, or the whole infinite causal chain is its own cause.\nEdward Feser argues that an essentially ordered series of causes cannot regress to infinity, even if it may be theoretically possible for accidentally ordered causes to do so.\nSeverinsen argues that there is an \"infinite\" and complex causal structure.\nWhite tried to introduce an argument \"without appeal to the principle of sufficient reason and without denying the possibility of an infinite causal regress\".\nA number of other arguments have been offered to demonstrate that an actual infinite regress cannot exist, viz.\nthe argument for the impossibility of concrete actual infinities, the argument for the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite, the argument from the lack of capacity to begin to exist, and various arguments from paradoxes.\n\n## Causal loop arguments\nSome objections to the cosmological argument refer to the possibility of loops in the structure of [cause and effect](https://bliptext.com/articles/causality) that would avoid the need for a First Cause.\nGott and Li refer to the curvature of [spacetime](https://bliptext.com/articles/spacetime) and [closed timelike curves](https://bliptext.com/articles/closed-timelike-curve) as possible mechanisms by which the universe may bring about its own existence.\n[Richard Hanley](https://bliptext.com/articles/richard-hanley) contends that causal loops are neither logically nor physically impossible, remarking: \"[In timed systems] the only possibly objectionable feature that all causal loops share is that coincidence is required to explain them.\"\nHowever, Andrew Loke argues that there is insufficient evidence to postulate a causal loop of the type that would avoid a First Cause.\nHe asserts that such a mechanism would suffer from the problem of [vicious circularity](https://bliptext.com/articles/temporal-paradox), rendering it [metaphysically](https://bliptext.com/articles/metaphysics) impossible.","revisionCount":0},"hasMore":false,"nextCursor":null}