Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), was a landmark case on the issue of religious and economic liberty decided by the United States Supreme Court. In a 6–3 decision, the Court held that a Pennsylvania blue law forbidding the sale of various retail products on Sunday was not an unconstitutional interference with religion as described in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Prior history

Blue laws in the United States had been passed by State legislatures, including Pennsylvania, prohibiting commerce the first day of the week, colloquially known as Sunday, which legislators referred to as "The Lord's day". Plaintiffs sought to have a 1959 Pennsylvania statute, 18 Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann. 4699.10 (1960 Cum. Supp.) overturned as unconstitutional. A three judge panel rejected their petition. (See Abraham Braunfeld v. Thomas J. Gibbons and Victor H. Blanc, 184 F. Supp. 352 (E.D.Pa 1959)). The Court also based its opinion in part on two earlier rulings.

The case

Background

Abraham Braunfeld and the other appellants were Pennsylvania merchants. As Orthodox Jews, the appellants were unable to do business on Friday evening or Saturday. They objected to a Pennsylvania law forbidding them from doing business on Sunday, arguing that the law unfairly discriminated against them by effectively forcing them to remain closed for one more day than competing Christian merchants.

Plurality opinion

Chief Justice Warren wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Justices Black, Clark, and Whittaker.

Concurrence/dissent (Frankfurter)

Justice Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion with which Justice Harlan joined as to most points. (Justice Frankfurter published that opinion as part of McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), but declared his opinion applicable to Braunfeld and several other cases. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 459, fn).

Concurrence/dissent (Brennan)

In his opinion, Justice Brennan concurred in the plurality opinion to the extent that it held that the Pennsylvania statute did not violate the Establishment Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, but dissented from the remainder of the opinion, arguing that the statute should be held unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause. Justice Brennan wrote in part: "[T]he issue in this case – and we do not understand either appellees or the Court to contend otherwise – is whether a State may put an individual to a choice between his business and his religion. The Court today holds that it may. But I dissent, believing that such a law prohibits the free exercise of religion." Two years later, Justice Brennan wrote a majority opinion, in Sherbert v. Verner, that largely tracked his dissent in this case. In the Sherbert case, the court struck down a law on Free Exercise grounds that prohibited a worker from collecting unemployment compensation who was terminated from her job because she would not work on Saturdays for religious reasons.

Dissent (Douglas)

Like Justice Frankfurter, Justice Douglas also published his Braunfeld dissent as part of the earlier McGowan decision, at 366 US 561–82. In that opinion, Justice Douglas argued that the "Sunday Laws" could not be separated from their religious roots, and that the imposition of those laws on persons of other religions violated both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution

Dissent (Stewart)

Justice Stewart joined Justice Brennan's dissent, and wrote further: "Pennsylvania has passed a law which compels an Orthodox Jew to choose between his religious faith and his economic survival. That is a cruel choice. It is a choice which I think no State can constitutionally demand. For me this is not something that can be swept under the rug and forgotten in the interest of enforced Sunday togetherness. I think the impact of this law upon these appellants grossly violates their constitutional right to the free exercise of their religion." Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 616.